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Systemic Decoupling in Digital Foreigner Reporting: Uneven APOA Adoption in Surakarta

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia has a legally supported digital mandate for reporting foreigners, but data intake in Surakarta's accommodation sector remains minimal. This article aims to explain this gap by analyzing Aplikasi Pelaporan Orang Asing (APOA) as a digital governance arrangement rather than a fully realized surveillance system. The study uses a qualitative case study based on documentary analysis and secondary institutional data, covering immigration regulations, official APOA procedures, a Surakarta accommodation dataset, and relevant literature on digital governance, technology adoption, and migration control. The empirical snapshot shows a marked decoupling between digital policy and reporting reality: registration rose from 26 of 976 accommodation units on 2 September 2025 to 31 of 976 on 27 November 2025, or 3.18% overall coverage. Hotel coverage reached 8.89%, while non-hotel accommodation coverage remained 0.45%. These figures do not demonstrate causal explanations or comparative patterns across jurisdictions, but they show that APOA's monitoring capacity is largely unrealized in this case. The article concludes that the central issue is a governance gap between formal control and actual compliance infrastructure: legal authority and platform availability are present, but coordination, reciprocal incentives, organizational follow-up, and trust-building remain insufficiently institutionalized.

ABSTRAK

Indonesia memiliki mandat digital untuk pelaporan orang asing, tetapi penerimaan data pada sektor akomodasi di Surakarta masih sangat rendah. Artikel ini bertujuan menjelaskan kesenjangan tersebut dengan menganalisis Aplikasi Pelaporan Orang Asing (APOA) sebagai tata kelola digital, bukan sebagai sistem pengawasan yang sudah sepenuhnya bekerja. Penelitian menggunakan studi kasus kualitatif berbasis analisis dokumen dan data kelembagaan sekunder, meliputi regulasi keimigrasian, prosedur resmi APOA, dataset akomodasi Surakarta, serta literatur tentang tata kelola digital, adopsi teknologi, dan kontrol migrasi. Data menunjukkan keterputusan antara kebijakan digital dan realitas pelaporan: registrasi naik dari 26 dari 976 unit akomodasi pada 2 September 2025 menjadi 31 dari 976 pada 27 November 2025, atau 3,18% cakupan keseluruhan. Cakupan hotel mencapai 8,89%,

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sedangkan akomodasi non-hotel tetap 0,45%. Angka ini tidak membuktikan penyebab rendahnya adopsi atau pola perbandingan antarwilayah, tetapi menunjukkan bahwa kapasitas pemantauan APOA belum terwujud secara luas dalam kasus ini. Artikel menyimpulkan bahwa persoalan utamanya adalah kesenjangan tata kelola antara kontrol formal dan infrastruktur kepatuhan aktual: dasar hukum dan platform tersedia, tetapi koordinasi, insentif timbal balik, tindak lanjut organisasi, dan pembentukan kepercayaan belum cukup terlembagakan.

A. INTRODUCTION

The core puzzle of this article is not that Indonesia lacks a digital reporting instrument for foreigner supervision. The puzzle is that a legally supported digital instrument can exist while its actual data intake remains statistically negligible in the local compliance network that it is supposed to organize. In the Surakarta Immigration Office jurisdiction, APOA registration increased from 26 of 976 accommodation units on 2 September 2025 to only 31 of 976 on 27 November 2025. By late November 2025, overall coverage was 3.18%, with hotel coverage at 8.89% and non-hotel accommodation coverage at only 0.45% (Surakarta Tourism Office, 2025). For a 2026 manuscript, this late-2025 snapshot should not be treated merely as a temporary teething problem. It signals a current socio-technical decoupling between digital mandate and grassroots reporting reality.

This article therefore analyzes APOA as a case of digital governance under conditions of incomplete compliance infrastructure. The study does not claim that APOA already performs comprehensive foreigner surveillance in Surakarta. On the contrary, the available data show that the platform's actual surveillance capacity is largely unrealized because only a small fraction of accommodation providers have entered the reporting system. The analytical object is thus not surveillance practice in a strong empirical sense, but the gap between surveillance potential, institutional design, and realized reporting coverage.

Immigration administration is a particularly useful domain for studying this gap. Unlike ordinary digital public services that citizens may adopt for convenience, accommodation-based foreigner reporting is embedded in legal obligation, public order, territorial control, and data-sensitive monitoring. The state expects non-state actors to produce timely information that can support immigration supervision. This makes APOA a useful case for examining how digital government moves beyond service delivery into distributed compliance, where state visibility depends on external actors' routine data work (Amoore, 2006; Broeders, 2007; Glouftsiou & Scheel, 2021; Leese, 2016).

The Indonesian regulatory environment gives APOA formal authority. Immigration supervision is anchored in Law Number 6 of 2011 on Immigration, amended by Law Number 63 of 2024, while the national digital government agenda is framed by Presidential Regulation Number 95 of 2018 on the Electronic-Based Government System (Sistem Pemerintahan Berbasis Elektronik [SPBE]). These regulations matter analytically because they establish the control side of the system: they authorize reporting obligations, justify digitalization, and provide a bureaucratic basis for platform-based supervision (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2011, 2018, 2024). However, regulatory authority alone does not guarantee that obligated actors will become routine digital data producers.

Existing digital government literature has long warned that public-sector digital transformation is not achieved by placing a procedure online. Digital-era governance involves changes in institutional relations, organizational routines, data infrastructures, and public value

arrangements (Bannister & Connolly, 2014; Cordella & Bonina, 2012; Dunleavy et al., 2006; Margetts & Dunleavy, 2013). In this article, digital governance is understood through the mechanisms of control, coordination, incentives, and trust (Hanisch et al., 2023). These mechanisms are not decorative concepts. They structure the analysis: control concerns obligation and authority; coordination concerns the alignment of actors and routines; incentives concern the distribution of burdens and benefits; and trust concerns the perceived legitimacy, manageability, and accountability of data-based reporting.

The Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) perspective is used in a narrower and nested way. It is not treated as a second, competing theory. Instead, TOE helps specify the conditions through which the four governance mechanisms become more or less workable. Technology concerns the fit between APOA procedures and user capacities; organization concerns the ability of the immigration office and accommodation providers to routinize reporting; and environment concerns the wider legal, tourism, licensing, and compliance ecosystem surrounding APOA (Oliveira & Martins, 2011; Zhu et al., 2006).

The article contributes to public administration scholarship in two ways. First, it reframes APOA from a technical application or service innovation into a governance arrangement that redistributes surveillance-related data work to accommodation providers. Second, it offers a bounded theoretical insight: digital reporting systems that rely on non-state data producers may intensify visibility in already formalized sectors while leaving less formal sectors weakly incorporated. This is not a universal claim about Indonesia, because this article uses only one local case and a limited institutional dataset. It is, however, a theoretically meaningful interpretation of a sharp implementation gap.

The research question is: How can the very low adoption of APOA in the Surakarta accommodation sector be understood from a digital governance perspective? The article argues that Surakarta's APOA implementation reflects systemic decoupling between formal digital control and actual compliance infrastructure. Legal authority and platform availability are present, but the available evidence suggests that coordination, reciprocal incentives, organizational follow-up, and trust-building have not yet been institutionalized deeply enough to convert obligation into broad reporting coverage.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Digital Governance as Institutional Alignment

Digital governance scholarship has moved beyond the assumption that public administration becomes transformed once digital tools are introduced. Janowski (2015) describes digital government evolution as a movement toward contextualized governance, while Mergel et al. (2019) define digital transformation as a change in organizational processes, relationships, and capabilities. Vial (2019) similarly emphasizes that digital transformation generates organizational disruption that must be managed through strategic and structural responses. These works converge on one point: technology matters because it reorganizes how institutions work, not because it automatically improves them. Recent public-administration research adds that digital governance requires strategic steering, cross-agency alignment, organizational capacity, legacy-system management, and readiness across infrastructure, leadership, security, and citizen engagement (Erkut, 2020; Gil-Garcia et al., 2018; Idzi & Gomes, 2022; Irani et al., 2023; Maheshwari et al., 2025; Moser-Plautz & Schmidhuber, 2023).

This perspective is important for APOA because foreigner reporting is not a simple online service. It is a digitally mediated obligation involving state authority, external users, and sensitive personal data. Dunleavy et al. (2006) and Margetts and Dunleavy (2013) show that digital-era governance alters administrative organization and public-sector coordination. Cordella and Bonina (2012) and Bannister and Connolly (2014) add that digitalization must be judged through public value, not only efficiency. For a surveillance-oriented reporting system,

public value includes lawful supervision, reliable data, accountable processing, and proportional administrative burden.

The mechanism framework proposed by Hanisch et al. (2023) provides a useful bridge between general digital governance theory and the APOA case. Control, coordination, incentives, and trust allow the analysis to move beyond the vague claim that implementation is not optimal. In this article, weak adoption is not interpreted as proof that all governance mechanisms have failed. Rather, the Surakarta case is read as an imbalance: the legal and procedural side of control is stronger than the relational mechanisms needed to make distributed reporting work.

Digital Migration Control and Distributed Data Work

Migration and border governance scholarship shows that digital systems often expand the state's capacity to sort, identify, and monitor mobile populations, but that this expansion is never purely technical. Amoores (2006) conceptualizes biometric borders as digitally mediated sites of mobility governance. Broeders (2007) shows how migration databases extend border control into internal administrative spaces, while Bigo (2014) examines the interaction between border guards, police, and database analysts in European border control. These studies matter for APOA because accommodation-based reporting also relocates supervision into everyday administrative spaces beyond the immigration office.

Recent work on border and migration digitization further emphasizes data infrastructures, contestation, and uneven effects. Glouftsiou and Scheel (2021) argue that migration management systems are produced through heterogeneous technical and institutional arrangements. Leese (2016) highlights the tension between security and facilitation at smart borders. Madianou (2019) warns that digital data practices can reproduce asymmetrical power relations when affected actors have little control over data systems. For APOA, the relevance of this literature lies not in equating accommodation reporting with border databases, but in showing that surveillance capacity depends on data production chains, institutional legitimacy, and user cooperation. Comparative studies of e-immigration also show that digital systems may improve services while still facing infrastructure, readiness, and operational-capacity constraints (Cabrera-Medina, 2024; Kimolo & Casmir, 2024; Kipingu & Shayo, 2021; Triandafyllidou, 2025).

This article therefore uses the term surveillance carefully. APOA's design can potentially support surveillance because it gathers identity, stay, and accommodation-related information from non-state actors. However, the Surakarta data do not demonstrate comprehensive surveillance practice. With only 3.18% of accommodation units registered, the more accurate empirical claim is that APOA creates a surveillance potential whose realization remains narrow and uneven. The difference between potential and practice is central to the revised argument.

Adoption, Compliance, and the Nested Use of TOE

Technology adoption literature helps explain why a formal system may not become a routine practice. The TOE framework identifies technological, organizational, and environmental conditions that shape adoption and routinization (Oliveira & Martins, 2011; Zhu et al., 2006). In the public sector, however, adoption is not merely a managerial or firm-level decision. It is shaped by legal authority, public values, organizational capacity, user support, and accountability (Cordella & Tempini, 2015; Gasco-Hernandez et al., 2022; Gong et al., 2020).

Public-sector digital transformation studies also show that low adoption often reflects a broader governance paradox rather than a simple technical failure. Savoldelli et al. (2014) define the e-government paradox as a gap between investment and use, while Wirtz and Daiser (2018) note that empirical e-government research repeatedly identifies implementation gaps between expected and realized outcomes. Klievink et al. (2017) show that public organizations

need data readiness, not merely data infrastructure. Janssen and van der Voort (2016) add that digital governance must balance adaptation with accountability and stability.

In this article, TOE is therefore nested within the governance-mechanism framework. The four mechanisms specify what kind of governance relationship is at stake, while TOE specifies the conditions through which those mechanisms become observable. Technological fit affects whether control is practically manageable. Organizational capacity affects whether coordination becomes routine. Environmental support affects whether incentives and trust can be sustained beyond formal obligation. This nesting prevents the analysis from becoming a checklist and clarifies why both frameworks are used.

Indonesian APOA Studies and the Conceptual Gap

Indonesian studies provide useful starting points but tend to focus on implementation barriers, system evaluation, or service innovation. Mulyawan (2017) identifies obstacles affecting APOA implementation. Wahyuni et al. (2019) evaluate APOA use through information system success and importance-performance perspectives. Tarigan et al. (2020) emphasize APOA's importance for immigration control. Dewi et al. (2025) discuss APOA-Next Generation as a service innovation while noting continued implementation challenges. These studies show that APOA has been examined, but mostly as a system whose use should be improved.

The contribution of the present article is different. It does not merely ask whether APOA is technically useful or whether socialization should be intensified. It asks what kind of governance arrangement is produced when the state relies on accommodation providers as routine producers of immigration-relevant data. This reframing matters because the weakness of APOA may lie not only in application quality or user awareness, but in the incomplete institutionalization of a distributed compliance network.

The Surakarta case is appropriate for this bounded intervention because it presents an unusually clear adoption gap across accommodation categories. The case does not establish whether Surakarta is typical or exceptional among Indonesian immigration jurisdictions. Without comparative adoption data, that claim cannot be made. Its analytical value lies in the sharp contrast between formal digital reporting ambition and very low local registration coverage. That contrast allows a focused discussion of digital governance decoupling in one local compliance ecosystem.

C. METHOD

This study uses a qualitative case study design based on documentary analysis and secondary institutional data. The design is appropriate because the article's purpose is not to reconstruct accommodation providers' lived experiences or to measure causal determinants statistically. It is to analyze the institutional logic of a policy-reality gap: why a legally mandated digital reporting arrangement can exist while local registration coverage remains very low. The study therefore relies on materials that are suitable for examining formal design, regulatory authority, procedural expectations, and observable registration coverage.

The unit of analysis is APOA implementation as a governance arrangement in the accommodation-based reporting network within the Surakarta Immigration Office jurisdiction. The empirical boundary is limited to the Surakarta jurisdiction and to the available registration snapshot between 2 September 2025 and 27 November 2025. The study does not analyze national APOA performance, does not compare Surakarta with other immigration offices, and does not claim to explain user motivations directly.

The materials consist of four categories: Indonesian immigration and digital government regulations; official APOA procedures and public information materials; secondary institutional data on accommodation units and APOA registration in the Surakarta jurisdiction;

and scholarly literature on digital governance, public-sector digital transformation, technology adoption, APOA implementation, and digitally mediated migration control. The accommodation data were obtained from the Surakarta Tourism Office listing as compiled in the authors' institutional dataset (Surakarta Tourism Office, 2025).

The analytical procedure involved three steps. First, the documents and dataset were reduced into relevant categories: regulatory mandate, APOA reporting design, accommodation categories, registration coverage, and temporal change. Second, these categories were displayed in tables to show both adoption levels and analytical indicators. Third, interpretation was conducted by reading the evidence through the governance mechanisms of control, coordination, incentives, and trust, with TOE used as a nested diagnostic layer. Claims were deliberately bounded: registration data are treated as evidence of coverage and category disparity, not as direct proof of actor motivation or institutional failure.

Table 1. Analytical operationalization and empirical boundaries used in the study

Governance dimension	Operational meaning in this article	Observable evidence used	Boundary of interpretation
Control	Legal and procedural authority requiring foreigner reporting through APOA	Immigration law, SPBE regulation, official APOA reporting procedures	Shows formal mandate and design, not actual enforcement intensity
Coordination	Alignment between immigration office, accommodation providers, and related local-sector actors	Category-level coverage across hotels and non-hotel accommodations; documentary references to reporting roles	Coverage disparity suggests uneven reach but does not identify exact coordination failures
Incentives	Balance between compliance burden and reciprocal value or support for users	Procedural requirements placed on accommodation providers; absence of direct evidence of user benefit in available documents	Supports a plausible diagnostic reading, not a demonstrated causal claim
Trust	Confidence that reporting is manageable, legitimate, secure, and supported	Sensitivity of identity/stay data and need for user support highlighted in literature and procedures	Treated as an implementation risk; not measured through interviews or surveys
TOE diagnostic layer	Technology, organization, and environment as conditions shaping the four mechanisms	APOA workflow, organizational routinization requirements, regulatory and accommodation ecosystem	Used to specify conditions, not as a separate competing framework

Source: Constructed by the authors from Hanisch et al. (2023), TOE literature, APOA procedures, and Surakarta institutional data.

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Low Registration as Evidence of Data-Intake Decoupling

The Surakarta data reveal a clear and narrow empirical finding: APOA registration coverage among accommodation providers was very low during the observed period. On 2 September 2025, 26 of 976 accommodation units had registered in APOA. On 27 November 2025, the number increased to 31. This means that only five additional units entered the system over nearly three months. The overall coverage rate by late November 2025 was 3.18%.

The category disparity is sharper than the aggregate number. Hotels accounted for 315 units, of which 28 had registered by late November 2025, producing 8.89% coverage. Non-hotel accommodations accounted for 661 units, of which only 3 had registered, producing 0.45% coverage. This means the registered APOA network was concentrated in the more formal hotel segment, while non-hotel accommodation remained almost entirely outside the platform.

Table 2. APOA registration coverage across accommodation categories in the Surakarta Immigration Office jurisdiction

Category	Total units	Registered in APOA (2 Sept 2025)	Registered in APOA (27 Nov 2025)	Coverage on 27 Nov 2025
Hotels	315	23	28	8.89%
Non-hotel accommodations	661	3	3	0.45%
Total	976	26	31	3.18%

Source: Surakarta Tourism Office (2025), accommodation listing in the working area of Surakarta Immigration Office, as compiled in the authors' institutional dataset.

This table is important because it shows that the issue is not merely low adoption in general, but uneven incorporation into the reporting network. The data support the claim that APOA's practical reach in Surakarta was narrow and asymmetrical. They do not, by themselves, support stronger causal claims such as user distrust, technical difficulty, or weak enforcement. Those remain plausible explanations that require interviews, observation, survey data, or comparative institutional records.

For this reason, the revised interpretation uses the term decoupling rather than failure. Failure would imply a definitive judgment about causes and responsibility. Decoupling more precisely describes the observable gap between formal digital policy and realized data intake. APOA exists, the reporting mandate exists, and the platform can potentially support supervision, but the local data-producing network remains minimally formed.

APOA as Distributed Compliance, Not Merely Software

Official APOA materials describe a platform through which accommodation owners or managers report foreign guests, including check-in and check-out information, guest identity data, reporting histories, and related digital procedures (Directorate General of Immigration, 2025). These features are administratively rational because they can standardize reporting and make immigration-relevant information more accessible to officers. However, the important governance point is not the interface itself. The important point is that APOA reorganizes the first layer of data production.

Through APOA, accommodation providers become reporting nodes in an immigration supervision network. This is a shift from centralized bureaucratic record-keeping toward distributed compliance. The state's ability to see foreigner presence through the platform depends on whether hotels, guest houses, homestays, and other accommodations regularly enter data. The adoption gap therefore weakens the real effect of the platform. A digital system that lacks data-producing participants cannot become a mature surveillance instrument even if its formal design is sophisticated.

This distinction responds directly to the conceptual tension in the earlier manuscript. APOA may expand surveillance potential, but in Surakarta it does not yet demonstrate comprehensive surveillance practice. The more careful claim is that APOA establishes a digital architecture for foreigner reporting, while the Surakarta data show that this architecture is only weakly populated by obligated users.

Governance Mechanisms: Stronger Control, Weaker Compliance Infrastructure

Control is the clearest mechanism in the available evidence. Immigration law, SPBE policy, and APOA procedures provide the formal basis for digital reporting. The platform's procedural design also reflects control because it asks accommodation providers to submit standardized information about foreign guests. This is the part of the system that is most visible in documents: authority exists, procedures exist, and reporting expectations exist.

Coordination is less directly observable. The low and uneven coverage in Table 2 suggests that the accommodation reporting network has not been broadly incorporated, especially among non-hotel units. However, the data do not show the precise coordination mechanism behind this gap. The revised analysis therefore treats weak coordination as a bounded interpretation: if a system requires a large number of external reporting actors but only 3.18% are registered, then coordination across the compliance ecosystem is at least not yet producing broad coverage. Whether this results from limited outreach, fragmented tourism data, business licensing gaps, staff capacity, or other factors cannot be determined from the available data alone.

Incentives are also interpreted cautiously. APOA imposes reporting work on accommodation providers, while the immediate governance benefit is concentrated in state visibility. This asymmetry is common in compliance-oriented digital systems: users bear administrative labor even when the main benefit accrues to the regulator. The available documents do not reveal how providers perceive this burden or whether they receive practical reciprocal benefits. Therefore, the article does not claim to prove incentive failure. It states that the system's incentive structure appears under-specified in the available materials and deserves field investigation.

Trust is the most sensitive and least directly measurable mechanism in this document-based study. Because APOA involves identity documents, stay records, and potentially location-related procedures, trustworthiness and accountability are relevant theoretical concerns (Alzahrani et al., 2017; Janssen et al., 2018; Lindquist & Huse, 2017). Yet the present data do not show whether providers distrust the system. The revised analysis therefore treats trust as a necessary condition for sustained compliance, not as a demonstrated empirical cause of low adoption. Existing adoption research similarly shows that trust can vary across service maturity levels and depends on visible public-sector credibility (Shareef et al., 2011; Virnandes et al., 2024).

The four-mechanism reading produces a more disciplined conclusion than the earlier broad claim of governance imbalance. The evidence supports a narrow diagnosis: formal control is visible in law and procedure, while broad operational incorporation is not visible in registration coverage. Coordination, incentives, and trust are the most plausible mechanisms through which the gap should be investigated and addressed, but they should not be presented as fully proven causes without primary data.

TOE Diagnosis: Why the Gap is Plausible Across Technology, Organization, and Environment

The nested TOE reading helps specify why such decoupling is plausible. Technologically, APOA requires device access, internet connection, account management, data entry, document capture or upload, dashboard navigation, and reporting routines. These requirements may be manageable for formal hotels with front-desk staff and standardized guest administration, but they may be more demanding for smaller non-hotel accommodations. This does not prove that non-hotel actors failed to register because of technical burden. It shows that the platform's operational grammar fits some accommodation segments more easily than others.

Organizationally, digital reporting becomes governance only when it is routinized. For immigration officers, routinization may require mapping accommodation actors, onboarding users, maintaining support channels, sending reminders, monitoring category-level coverage, and following up with low-participation segments. For accommodation providers, routinization requires integrating APOA into everyday check-in and check-out practices. The Surakarta data suggest that this routinization was incomplete, especially among non-hotel accommodations, but the exact organizational process requires further field evidence.

Environmentally, APOA sits across immigration administration, tourism accommodation, business licensing, and local compliance networks. A platform-centered strategy may be insufficient when the reporting obligation depends on actors outside the immigration bureaucracy. This is consistent with Indonesian SPBE studies showing that policy presence alone does not secure digital government outcomes when coordination and local readiness vary (Adinata et al., 2024; Afiqurrahman et al., 2022). In Surakarta, the relevant environmental question is not only whether APOA is legally mandated, but whether the surrounding ecosystem helps providers become stable reporting actors.

Theoretical Implication: Formal-Sector Visibility and Informal-Sector Opacity

The Surakarta case suggests a broader but bounded theoretical insight for digital governance. When a digital reporting system relies on distributed compliance, it may first become effective among actors that are already formal, administratively legible, and organizationally capable. In this case, hotel coverage was still low, but it was far higher than non-hotel coverage. This pattern suggests that digitalization may intensify visibility in the formalized segment before it widens visibility across the whole field.

The implication is not that digitalization is useless. Rather, digitalization can sharpen visibility where reporting routines already fit the institutional environment, while leaving less formal sectors outside the data infrastructure. This finding connects digital governance literature with migration surveillance scholarship: data-based supervision depends not only on platforms, but on the social and organizational conditions that produce data in the first place (Bigo, 2014; Klievink et al., 2017; Meijer & Bekkers, 2015).

This insight helps clarify the article's novelty. Many implementation studies would recommend more socialization or technical improvement. Those recommendations are useful but incomplete. The Surakarta case points to a deeper governance problem: APOA is designed as a distributed reporting network, but its implementation strategy appears not yet sufficiently differentiated for the unequal accommodation ecosystem it must govern.

Administrative Implications

First, APOA implementation should be segmented by accommodation type. Hotels and non-hotel accommodations should not be treated as administratively equivalent because their capacity, routines, and proximity to formal bureaucracy may differ. The 8.89% hotel coverage and 0.45% non-hotel coverage indicate that flat outreach is unlikely to solve the problem.

Second, performance monitoring should move beyond aggregate registration counts. The immigration office should monitor category coverage, area distribution, active reporting behavior, inactive accounts, repeated reporting errors, and follow-up outcomes. Registration is only the entry point; governance maturity depends on sustained use.

Third, APOA requires ecosystem coordination. Collaboration with tourism offices, licensing units, accommodation associations, village or neighborhood structures, and local supervision networks could help identify accommodation units, tailor outreach, and reduce information gaps. The goal is not merely to publicize the platform, but to build an accommodation-based reporting network.

Fourth, compliance should be supported by reciprocity and trust-building. This includes clear guidance, responsive help channels, transparent data responsibilities, simplified procedures for small providers, and visible feedback that reporting has administrative value. Coercive authority may establish obligation, but durable digital governance requires users to experience the system as manageable and legitimate.

Finally, future evaluation should collect primary data. Interviews with immigration officers, accommodation managers, tourism officials, and local stakeholders are needed to determine whether low adoption is driven by technical barriers, limited awareness, perceived burden, distrust, weak follow-up, or other factors. Comparative data from other immigration offices would also clarify whether Surakarta reflects a local anomaly or a broader pattern in APOA implementation.

E. CONCLUSION

This article revised the APOA case as a study of systemic decoupling between formal digital reporting authority and actual local data intake. The Surakarta evidence shows that by 27 November 2025 only 31 of 976 accommodation units had registered in APOA, producing 3.18% overall coverage. The disparity between hotels and non-hotel accommodations is especially important: hotels reached 8.89% coverage, while non-hotel accommodations remained at 0.45%. These figures show narrow and uneven registration, not comprehensive surveillance practice.

The main analytical conclusion is that APOA's weakness in Surakarta should not be reduced to the existence or quality of the application. APOA is a digital governance arrangement that depends on distributed compliance. The available evidence shows that the formal control mechanism is present through law, regulation, and platform procedure, but it does not show equivalent incorporation of the wider accommodation ecosystem. Coordination, incentives, organizational routinization, and trust-building therefore become the key governance mechanisms to be strengthened and empirically examined.

The theoretical implication is that digital reporting systems may intensify visibility in already formalized sectors while leaving less formal sectors weakly incorporated. This insight is bounded by the study's empirical limitations. The analysis relies on document analysis and secondary institutional data, lacks interviews with system users, and does not include comparative data from other immigration jurisdictions. For that reason, causal explanations in this article are framed as disciplined interpretations and hypotheses, not as proven determinants.

The practical implication is straightforward: APOA implementation should shift from platform availability toward compliance-network building. Segmented outreach, category-specific monitoring, ecosystem coordination, responsive user support, and clearer data accountability are needed to make the system more than a digitized reporting form. Future research should test the mechanisms proposed here through fieldwork and comparative analysis, especially across jurisdictions with different accommodation structures and adoption levels.

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Fitriana Riscadewi Warisno: conceptualization, writing-original draft, data curation, and analysis. Sudarmo: supervision, methodology guidance, review, and editing. Sri Yuliani: supervision, theoretical framing, review, and editing.

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